

for the program. I will not do so, however, for the following reasons.

First, the Appropriations Committee, in reporting out the bill, made clear that it, too, wants a choice soon between the AX and the Cheyenne. Let me quote from the committee report:

It is the view of the committee that the development of the Cheyenne should be continued in order that it may be fully evaluated along with the A-X light attack aircraft to determine which should be produced for the close air support mission. *It is hoped that this decision will be rejected in the budget for fiscal year 1973.*

Second, the Senate Armed Services Committee is itself in the process of concluding hearings on the close support question, hearings which should enable it to make its own recommendations for a solution to present problems sometime in the next month or two.

With both these important committees committed to a prompt resolution of these problems, it would not be appropriate for me to preempt them at this time. I trust that constructive action will be forthcoming soon. And I remain convinced that the advantages of the A-X over the Cheyenne will be plainly perceived when the decision is made.

II. A-7D ADVANCE PRODUCTION FUNDING

Let me turn my attention now to a second specific subject—the \$5.8 million in advance procurement funds for a fiscal 1973 A-7D buy which were contained in the bill as reported by the House, but which were deleted by the Senate Appropriations Committee. I strongly support the Senate committee's action and believe it important to state precisely why.

First, we have no need for additional A-7D's in the primary interdiction bombing role for which they have always been purchased. Air Force and Navy purchases of different A-7 models have already totaled almost 1,200 for fiscal years 1967 through 1972. And Secretary Laird stated in testimony to Congress last March that the 97 A-7D's in the fiscal 1972 budget "will complete our planned procurement of A-7D's." It should also be noted that no advance procurement funds would be needed if the Defense Department changed its mind and decided that more A-7D's were in order. In that event the Department could stretch out this year's buy to permit a smoother production rate through next year, thereby saving money overall for the 2-year period and obviating the need for advance procurement funds this year.

Second, there is no reason to buy more A-7D's and keep the line open to provide a hedge against difficulties in the A-X program. I doubt to begin with whether such a hedge is needed. But even if it is, we already have plenty of available A-7D's for use in a fly-off with the A-X. And if it were decided to continue with the A-7D after that fly-off, it would cost only \$20 million to reopen the A-7D line, a cost which should be contrasted with the \$70 million cost of keeping it open through next fiscal year. In fact, we are already planning to keep open through fiscal 1976 the A-7E line on which a very similar plane is turned out. That is why the costs of reopening the A-7D line would be so low.

I believe, therefore, that there is no sound defense policy consideration which calls for the appropriation of A-7D advance procurement funds at this time. And the defense budget is not the proper vehicle for boosting profits and employment opportunities in selected areas of the country. I sincerely hope, therefore, that the conference committee will support the Senate's action on these advancement procurement funds.

Mr. EAGLETON. Mr. President, again this year, the Army's "dream tank," which long ago turned into a taxpayer's nightmare, has squeaked through, alive if not well.

The Senate Appropriations Committee has decided not to follow the lead of the House, which deleted all funds requested by the administration—\$86.6 million—for the MBT-70/XM-803 program and recommended that \$20 million be spent in search of ways to improve the current generation of tanks. The committee, to quote its report, did "not approve the continuation of the XM803 program, nor has it recommended its termination." Instead, the Senate Appropriations Committee has requested the Secretary of Defense to review the XM803 program, something that has been done before, apparently without benefit.

In each of the last 3 years the MBT-70/XM-803 has come under fire. In 1969 the GAO reported that the tank program was in need of serious review. Secretary Packard assured Congress that such a review would be conducted. At the end of the "review" Secretary Packard promised a cost reduction of \$250,000 per tank, from \$850,000 to \$600,000.

However, by early 1971 costs were again soaring.

Earlier this year, the House Armed Services Committee revealed, and the Senate Armed Services Committee confirmed, that the MBT-70/XM803 would cost over \$1.1 million per unit, not \$600,000. And although the MBT-70/XM803 program was cut from the \$86.6 to \$62.8 million in authorization, this rolling blunderbuss survived an effort by the House Armed Services Committee to bring it to a halt.

As the House Armed Services Committee stated earlier this year:

Recurring expressions of concern, both within the Army and by independent external observers, that the tank is nearing the end of its era of combat capability also influenced the Committee in its decision. New anti-tank weapons, including missiles, have brought about this obsolescence; and Soviet technical capabilities would permit them to field such anti-tank weapons before the MBT-70, or any alternative tank, has been in the force structure very long. In this connection, the Committee notes that both Russia and Germany appear to have recognized the diminishing utility of the heavy tanks and are placing more and more emphasis on light, hard-hitting, anti-tank vehicles and weapons. Although the USSR will probably continue to use its medium tank, its heavy tank is no longer in production, and is being gradually phased out of inventory. In any event, the U.S. M60A1 and the M60A1E2 are qualitatively equal to or better than any USSR tank now in the field or anticipated in the foreseeable future.

Less than 2 weeks ago, the House Appropriations Committee, after intensive

study of the MBT-70/XM-803 program by the members and committee staff, recommended that all funds for the program be deleted, and that \$20 million be added to R. & D. for the purpose of initiating a prototype program to provide a reasonably priced tank for the 1970's. In its report, the House Appropriations Committee stated of the tank:

The Committee had its Surveys and Investigations staff conduct a thorough study of the main battle tank program during 1971. It was found that the Army simply was unable to support its cost estimates for the austere version of the tank and that it would in all probability cost between \$850,000 to over \$1,000,000 each depending upon whether or not total program acquisition costs are used in computing the unit cost. The Committee is firmly convinced that no tank is worth that much money, particularly when Army witnesses advise that the less costly M60A1 is as good or better in some respects than deployed Soviet battle tanks. Taking into consideration the size of the existing Soviet armor threat in Europe and the advertised capabilities of the MBT-70/XM803, it is highly doubtful that the United States could devote the necessary resources to acquire at such a high cost an MBT-70/XM803 in sufficient numbers to satisfy the requirements of the Army in meeting the Soviet tank threat.

The Committee continues to feel that the MBT-70/XM803 is unnecessarily complex, excessively sophisticated, and too expensive, and that the Army, by eliminating or modifying relatively minor features, has failed to satisfy the recommendation in the committee report on the fiscal year 1970 bill. For these reasons the Committee has recommended that all funds for the MBT-70/XM803 be deleted from the fiscal year 1972 budget and the program terminated. In its stead, the Committee has recommended that \$20,000,000 be added to the Army R.D.T. & E. budget for the purpose of initiating a prototype program to build a limited number of tanks of two different designs for test and evaluation. While the Committee does not consider the austere MBT-70/XM803 to be a prototype candidate, that tank does have certain design features such as spaced armor, low silhouette, turret stabilization, and a gun capable of firing a kinetic energy round that should be incorporated in the prototype. The use of Daimler-Benz engine, which was developed as a back-up engine during the joint development program with the Germans, should also be seriously considered for one of the prototype designs.

On November 16, 1971, the able chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Mr. MAHON, echoed what I have been saying for several years. He stated:

It is felt that to continue the main battle tank program would be to throw good money after bad . . . The proposed XM-803 is unnecessarily complex, excessively sophisticated, and too expensive.

Chairman MAHON is not against a strong defense. Neither is Congressman STRATTON, who has done an outstanding job of bringing the MBT-70/XM-803 program under the scrutiny of the House Armed Services Committee. Neither am I. No responsible Member of Congress wants a weak America.

But for far too long, a "strong defense" has been equated in too many minds with the most sophisticated and costly weapons systems that money can buy. And that simply is not a valid calculation.

To drain our treasury, to spend ourselves into bankruptcy, in pursuit of super and super-expensive weapons which other countries do not feel obligated to

have, has been the hallmark of defense spending since the 1960's. In pursuit of the "blockbuster," we have overlooked functional and less expensive weapons.

Many of us in Congress have been saying during the last 3 years that more costly and technologically fancy weapons do not necessarily add to our security—that, in fact, wasteful military spending can seriously impair our overall ability to defend ourselves.

The House Committee has already recognized this and the Senate Committee seems to be on the verge of doing so. Granted, much more must be done. But by deleting funds for the MBT-70/XM-803 program, the House Committee has taken an important step toward reestablishing sanity to our search for security. I urge the Senate to accept the House recommendation in conference.

Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, Monday's Washington Post should be mandatory reading for those who are fond of talking about the war in Vietnam that is "winding down." On page one we read:

Thousands of South Vietnamese troops, spearheaded by an armored column, pushed north from Highway 7 in eastern Cambodia today in the start of a new offensive . . . Scores of U.S. helicopters and advisers moved into Tay Ninh to support the operation.

In an adjoining article about the war in Cambodia titled, "Bloody Little Battle" we read this description of the villages on the outskirts of Phnom Penh:

The Communists are massed in the fields and bushes, attracting Cambodian artillery, South Vietnamese bombers, and American helicopter gunships. Along the roads, there are hundreds of refugee families, in carts drawn by cows, taking their possessions to a nearby village or pagoda, only to move again when that refuge is threatened . . . Last weekend the Communists seized the railroad station town of Toul Leap, about three miles from here, wiping one whole Cambodian battalion in the process. The bombers and gunships went to work and the enemy has been run out. But there is no more town.

On the editorial page in a column written from Svayrieng, Cambodia, we read:

Meanwhile, refugees at a camp near here, whose homes were destroyed by U.S. bombing and allied artillery fire, exist with a pitiful shortage of food, shelter, clothing. American funds must be reserved, officials explain, for the military and essential economic programs which other countries won't provide . . . Thus Cambodia has found its place in the Southeast Asian dilemma. It looks to the United States to be able to survive, and about all the United States knows how to do is help speed destruction. Having become involved this far, America can't decently tell the Cambodians to forget it and lose. But neither can either country gain from a bloodier war.

Then, back to page 1, we read:

Meanwhile, in Saigon, the U.S. Command announced one of the deepest bombing raids this year inside North Vietnam, against an anti-aircraft gun site near Vinh . . . It was the 80th "protective reaction" strike by U.S. planes over North Vietnam this year, and the fifth within the last eight days . . . U.S. Air Force and Navy fighter-bombers made their 79th "protective reaction" strike of 1971 inside North Vietnam earlier Sunday." The same article states, "U.S. headquarters also reported three more B-52 raids in the

northwest corner of South Vietnam along the Laos Border . . . Saigon headquarters reported a Vietcong mortar shelling early Monday of Hoian . . . In the same area, Saigon headquarters said, an enemy unit shelled and attacked a regional force position Monday morning near the district town of Ducduc . . . Fresh fighting was also reported in the Central Highlands.

Perhaps Gary Wills' column in the same paper sums it all up best:

Vietnam has always been the invisible war. We were in it before we knew we were in. And we have forgotten it before we are out. There is a feeling that if the war is not an issue, it is nothing; it does not exist . . . So we hear a great deal about withdrawals, each time there are some, while our bombing is increased; our "support troops" keep the Thieu regime in office, its own troops in the field; and "Vietnamization" means continuation of the war until we can entirely forget it—and then all the pretensions on which it has been prolonged can collapse unnoticed. For the aim of the war is no longer to win it, but to forget it.

It is an indictment of our moral insensitivity for this body to vote more money for continuing the war, while in the same breath we talk about the war's end—if we talk about the war at all.

It is worth noting just how long we have been winding down this war. The Paris talks, begun ostensibly to bring the war to a close, first met on May 13, 1968. That was almost 3½ years ago—we have been in the process of "winding the war down" or ending the war for that long. The war had already been going on with substantial American involvement since 1965.

As one who fought in World War II, I cannot help but remember that it took about 3½ years for that war, against Germany and Japan, to begin, escalate, and totally cease. In other words, by the end of the year, we will have been in the process of just ending this war for about as long as it took us to fight all of World War II, and with no real end to the fighting and bloodshed in sight.

Just how is this war winding down? First of all, in terms of the U.S. troops actually there on the ground. This we all know. The total number of troops in Vietnam has been reduced by about 67 percent. Furthermore, in 1967, U.S. troops made up 34 percent of the total allied troops there. Presently, they comprise about 10.6 percent of those forces. There has been a corresponding drop in the percentage of Americans killed in action among all those of the allied forces who die. Through 1971 thus far, U.S. soldiers have comprised about 6 percent of those allied forces killed in action, compared to about 38 percent in 1967. But that is one of the few dramatic ways in which the ugly statistics of bloodshed and death in Indochina are changing.

Consider, for example, the rate of overall casualties in Indochina. In 1967, there were about 24,000 to 25,000 deaths from hostile action among allied forces; these figures include estimates of allied deaths in Laos. At the very peak of the war in 1968, there were over 45,000 allied deaths. If we look at the average rate of overall total casualties among the South Vietnamese, Americans, and other allies,

we find that from 1966 through this year, that average has been about 30,400 deaths per year. Now, when we look at the overall allied casualty rate for this year, and assume that will continue to be about the same, we find that there will be about 31,590 total deaths from hostile action in 1971—a figure higher than the level in 1967, when our troop strength was growing to its peak level. Of course, the current level of overall casualties among the allied forces has reduced from that during the Laotian invasion, earlier this year, and from the Cambodian invasion last year. But taken on the whole, and put into perspective since 1966, we find that overall military deaths from the fighting in Indochina are continuing this year at an alarming level, only slightly reduced from last year. The substantial reduction of American deaths has not been matched by any similar reduction in the Vietnamese who are dying in this war. And the official statistics reporting enemy deaths would lead us to believe that at our present rate, we will kill about 20 percent more enemy soldiers this year than last. My point is that as far as the Vietnamese are concerned, this war is not winding down.

Civilian casualties further reflect the reality of a war whose destruction and suffering for the people of Indochina knows no end. Precise figures and trends are not known. The Pentagon has never seen the need to make the kind of estimates of civilians killed in the way as they have for the number of enemy soldiers who die, and are computed each week. The only estimates that we do have come from sources outside of the executive branch, such as the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees. The evidence suggests that as the overall bomb tonnage over South Vietnam has decreased in the past 2 years, civilian casualties may be reduced from the peak of the war in 1968. Yet, as the bombing has begun in earnest in Cambodia since early 1970 and has significantly intensified in Laos since the beginning of 1969, civilian casualties in those countries have become significantly intensified. Estimates placed the number of refugees in Laos during June of this year at 315,000, or more than 10 percent of the entire population of the country. This amounts to an increase of 240 percent since 1969. And in Cambodia, the refugee toll since April 1970 is believed to be about 1.5 million people.

When the total tragic toll of this war's continuing human cost is taken, we find that the suffering for the people of Indochina is not winding down at all. In fact, it can be argued that the overall suffering of the war—those killed, wounded, and made refugees—has actually been rising this year compared to last. During the time that we have been "ending the war," the human suffering it is causing, while somewhat less intense within South Vietnam, has been tragically magnified throughout Laos and Cambodia in ways unknown during the Johnson years of the war.

The human toll of the war's suffering has always been most heavily inflicted by the bombs that have fallen on Indochina.

By the end of this year, we will have dropped 6 million tons of bombs on Indochina, an area about the size of Texas. That is 3 times the total tonnage used in World War II. Nearly half of this total will have been dropped during the first 3 years of this administration. In fact, the 2.9 million tons dropped since the beginning of 1969 through August of this year is more than the total tonnage dropped during the last 3 years of the Johnson administration, when the bombing of North Vietnam was being undertaken. That 2.9 million tons also exceeds the combined total of the bombing during World War II and the Korean war, and is only slightly less than the 3.2 million tons dropped during the 4 years of President Johnson's bombing policies.

It has been pointed out that the total of bombs dropped over Indochina has decreased in the past 2 years, and this is true. Primarily this reflects the substantial decrease in the level of bombing in South Vietnam proper, as well as the cessation of bombing over North Vietnam at the end of 1968.

What is far more revealing, however, is the way in which new air war has been opened in Cambodia, and the ongoing air war has been greatly intensified in Laos.

During the height of the bombing of North Vietnam, our bombs were falling at the rate of 200,000 tons per year. It is thought that during the peak there were at least 1,000 civilian casualties per week.

The effects of that bombing campaign were well documented by authors and members of the press who were allowed to visit North Vietnam during that time. And as the Pentagon papers reveal, the "Rolling Thunder" was a carefully orchestrated attempt to bring North Vietnam to their knees by our bombing.

Revealing comparisons between that bombing and our present level of bombing can be made. The bombing in Laos, for instance, increased by 2½ times in 1969 over 1968, and has remained since then about 44,000 tons per year—more than twice the level of the bombing of North Vietnam. About 90,000 tons of bombs will fall on Cambodia this year, in that country's relatively young air war. And in South Vietnam, the one place where our bombing has decreased under the present administration, we will drop about 270,000 tons this year—still higher than the peak of our bombing of North Vietnam.

We could phase out the U.S. bases for our planes within South Vietnam next year. But our planes based in Thailand, on carriers, and at Pacific bases will remain for the air war that will continue for years into the future, if there is no political settlement of this war.

It cannot be seriously contended that the air war is winding down or ending. There are overall decreases in total tonnage dropped, but of far greater consequence for those who live in Indochina is that the air war has escalated geographically over new areas previously spared from our bombs. The human consequences are revealed in thousands of new casualties and refugees from those same locations.

We have been winding down the rhetoric about this war; it has been talked about so little lately that you would think it is over. But little else about this tragedy is being wound down or ended.

The Mansfield amendment which has now become law declares it to be the policy of the United States to withdraw all of its forces and end all military operations at the earliest practicable date. In implementing that policy, it calls upon the President to set that date certain.

The administration, however, has announced that they intend to disregard the Mansfield amendment which has become the law of the land.

We have heard about this war winding down for long enough. And the people of Indochina have suffered under this perpetually "ending" war for long enough.

By voting for the defense appropriations bill, we are all voting to continue the war that we are trying so hard to forget. Therefore, I shall vote against the bill, and urge other Senators to do likewise until the President announces the date for our total military withdrawal from Indochina.

Let us vote to stop this tragedy and save ourselves and our country.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that four articles published in the Washington Post on Monday, November 22, to which I have referred, appear at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 22, 1971]
SAIGON LAUNCHES NEW OFFENSIVE INSIDE CAMBODIA

UNITED STATES TAKES SUPPORT ROLE IN OPERATION

SAIGON, November 22 (Monday).—Thousands of South Vietnamese troops, spearheaded by an armored column, pushed north from Highway 7 in eastern Cambodia today in the start of a new offensive.

U.S. advisers said the drive is aimed at raiding staging areas from which elements of three North Vietnamese divisions could attack South Vietnamese bases on the highway, about 90 miles northwest of Saigon.

South Vietnamese field commanders said they anticipated that the new operation would also relieve enemy pressure on Phnom Penh and on the 20,000-man Cambodian government force battling Communist-led troops on the northeastern front in Cambodia.

Initial reports said that more than 5,000 South Vietnamese soldiers were involved in the opening thrust. The number was expected to increase.

There were no immediate reports of significant ground contact, but South Vietnamese air strikes killed 40 enemy soldiers west of the town of Krek, officers in the field said.

Officers said the operation could last up to 30 days, depending on what the South Vietnamese find.

Scores of U.S. helicopters and advisers moved into Tay Ninh to support the operation. Tay Ninh, 55 miles northwest of Saigon, is the forward command post for South Vietnamese operations into eastern Cambodia.

Communist-led forces who have fought their way to within 10 miles of the Cambodian capital are known to be resupplied from bases in the border region.

The South Vietnamese field commanders felt that the Communist-led forces would have to divert some men from fighting elsewhere in Cambodia to protect their base

camp and storage depots in the border region north of Highway 7.

Meanwhile, in Saigon, the U.S. Command announced one of the deepest bombing raids this year inside North Vietnam, against an anti-aircraft gun site near Vinh.

The command said four Navy A-7 Corsairs based on a carrier in the Tonkin Gulf struck at the site Sunday afternoon after North Vietnamese guns fired on an unarmed Navy reconnaissance plane.

It was the 80th "protective reaction" strike by U.S. planes over North Vietnam this year, and the fifth within the last eight days.

The command said that results of the strike were not known and that there was no damage to the four attack bombers or the reconnaissance plane, which apparently was on a photo mission over North Vietnam.

Vinh, a major North Vietnamese city about 145 miles north of the Demilitarized Zone, is at the hub of five supply routes. The site was eight miles west of the coast, the command said.

U.S. headquarters also reported three more B-52 raids in the northwest corner of South Vietnam along the Laos border.

South Vietnamese headquarters said its propeller-driven Skyraiders attacked North Vietnamese positions near Chrum in eastern Cambodia and pilots claimed 40 North Vietnamese killed. The claim was not confirmed by a body count on the ground.

Saigon headquarters reported a Vietcong mortar shelling early Monday of Holan, a coastal province capital 15 miles south of Danang. The shelling hit a U.S. compound, wounding five American servicemen, and also damaged South Vietnamese installations, wounding four militiamen and four civilians.

In the same area, Saigon headquarters said, an enemy unit shelled and attacked a regional force position Monday morning near the district town of Ducduc, about 25 miles south of Danang. Headquarters said the attack was repelled.

Fresh fighting also was reported in the Central Highlands. Fields reports said a battalion of North Vietnamese attacked the Pleidjereng South Vietnamese ranger camp, 25 miles west of Pleiku and 12 miles from the Cambodian border, on Sunday.

There was no immediate word on casualties. It was the second attack on the camp in three days.

U.S. Air Force and Navy fighter-bombers made their 79th "protective reaction" strike of 1971 inside North Vietnam earlier Sunday. Pilots said they knocked out two enemy anti-aircraft 80 miles north of the DMZ and near the North Vietnam-Laos border when the site fired on an American bomber on a mission over the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

[From the Washington Post, Nov. 22, 1971]
BLOODY LITTLE BATTLE
NIGHT FIGHT NEAR PHNOM PENH LEAVES
THE QUESTION: WHY?

(By Peter Osnos)
PREY KHIEU, CAMBODIA, November 21.—For the better part of five hours early today, Cambodian soldiers withstood a determined enemy ground attack atop this bump in the rice paddies, just 15 miles from the center of Phnom Penh.

When it ended at sunrise, 13 Cambodians were dead, including three soldiers' wives and one child. Another 23 people were wounded. Some of these were women and children, too.

The enemy left two bodies behind. One, found near the Cambodians' skimpy command post, was wearing only shorts and a skull cap. He carried a grenade bag and had made himself darker with charcoal. He looked Vietnamese.

It was a tough and bloody little battle that proved nothing. But it was close enough to the capital to be considered part of the enemy's dramatically stepped-up activity in

the area, and for that reason it was significant.

American officials maintain that the attacks are merely harassment and not intended to culminate in a drive on Phnom Penh. That remains to be seen. For the moment, the city itself seems as quiet and lovely as always, except for the sound of constant artillery fire at night.

But in the villages on the outskirts to the northwest, there is considerable fear. The Communists are massed in the fields and bushes, attracting Cambodian artillery, South Vietnamese bombers and American helicopter gunships.

Along the roads, there are hundreds of refugee families, in carts drawn by cows, taking their possessions to a nearby village or pagoda, only to move again when that refuge is threatened.

The family of 48-year-old Nop Sim, his wife, children and grandchildren, fled from their home a month ago and came to a pagoda called Angtaloenk because Vietcong and Khmer Rouge were gathering in the vicinity.

Today, because of the fighting at Prey Khieu, a mile or so away, they were preparing to go again, taking Nop Sim's sister along also because now her village is endangered too.

At midday, A-37 bombers were making strike after strike just a few hundred yards from the bumpy road where the farmers and some of the weary defenders of Prey Khieu were making their way to safety.

The company atop the knoll had been there for a month, with only a few light contacts. Then at 1:30 a.m. this morning the enemy struck with rocket and mortar fire and, at practically the same time, moved in on the ground.

In one corner of the Cambodian outpost the attackers killed three soldiers and one wife. From the way the dead looked, they were hit pointblank. A shallow trench had been dug where the enemy fortified the tiny stronghold they had taken.

Ut Seng Ean, 35, commander of the company at Prey Khieu, said that at the height of the fighting there were 40 Communists, while his force was 120 men strong. The Cambodians must have held their own, because the enemy withdrew. But the company was tired so replacements were brought in.

What is most distinctive about the Cambodian position is how weak it looks. Although they had been there for weeks, the soldiers had built no bunkers and relied on lean-tos made of palm leaves. The new company seemed content to leave things that way.

There is every likelihood that the Communists will make another try for the knoll, and probably, if they risked enough men, could take it. But then what? The hill is high ground, commanding a view as far as Phnom Penh, but is also a prime target for bombers and gunships.

Last weekend the Communists seized the railroad station town of Toul Leap, about three miles from here, wiping out a whole Cambodian battalion in the process. The bombers and gunships went to work and the enemy has been run out. But there is no more town.

At Toul Leap, the Communist surrounded the Cambodian battalion's camp in one section of the town and allowed most of the villagers to flee. Fighting went on for four days, and when it was over fewer than 10 of the Cambodians made it out. The rest were killed, captured, or wounded.

The Cambodians counterattacked with a brigade led by Lon Non, the mercurial brother of Prime Minister Lon Nol. By the standards of the Cambodian war, air support was very heavy.

It took four days to rout the enemy, and when the Cambodians finally made their way to the town they met very little resis-

tance. The official government news agency declared that their soldiers' victory was "astonishing."

This morning, as if to prove that they are still around, the Communists fired about 20 mortar rounds into the rubble of the town and killed three Cambodians.

For the enemy, taking Toul Leap accomplished little more than would overrunning Prey Khieu—at least the town had food. The Communists must have a reason for what they are doing, the Cambodians say, but nobody has a clue what it is and that is what makes them especially nervous.

In the meantime, all that is known for sure is that the enemy is hitting closer and closer to the capital.

AN INVISIBLE WAR IS SOON FORGOTTEN (By Garry Wills)

Vietnam has always been the invisible war. We were in it before we knew we were in. And we have forgotten it before we are out. There is a feeling that if the war is not an issue, it is nothing; it does not exist. Even its critics, among the politicians, are afraid to run hard against it, for fear they will base their campaign on a non-existent thing. And the administration, of course, keeps taking credit for having ended the war because it is in the process of ending it.

So we hear a great deal about withdrawals, each time there are some, while our bombing is increased; our "support troops" keep the Thieu regime in office, its own troops in the field; and "Vietnamization" means continuation of the war until we can entirely forget it—and then all the pretensions on which it has been prolonged can collapse unnoticed.

For the aim of the war is no longer to win it, but to forget it. We cannot withdraw entirely without remembering the pesty thing. If we phase out, the same thing will, in time, take place that would have followed on a complete withdrawal two years ago. But "phasing out" lets us avoid looking at what is happening. That is worth a great deal to us, and we are paying a great deal for it, in money and lives (our own and others').

The worst danger is that our prolongation of "phase-out," to achieve forgetfulness, will lead to an open-ended minimal "presence" in Vietnam, with a residual force just sufficient to keep the Vietnamese fighting each other for another decade. It would be our last cruel gift to this country we have absently ravaged so long, and it would guarantee a hatred for us quite earned, a hatred felt by all sides (as already it is felt in some measure, by followers of a Diem or Ky no less than by partisans of the Vietcong).

Our rulers do not tend to think in terms of "costs" to others. But even they see one danger in the "residual force" solution—the danger of a rear-guard massacre, once our residual troops reach a dangerously exposed minimum.

It is on this subject that the China and Moscow visits can be most useful. Our President, like the other rulers, must deny that the fate of Saigon and Hanoi will be settled in the absence of either regime's representatives. And it is true that direct settlement of the war cannot be conducted at such meetings. But our cordial relations with such "big brothers" of the Communist world must give Hanoi pause at anything so offensive as a slaughter of remaining Americans.

On the other hand, pressure can be put on us through this network of forces making for coexistence to take our tempting exposed last targets out for good and all. In this way, the politics of these visits may betray Mr. Nixon into statesmanship, into a real ending of the war, not mere hypnotic lullings of our consciousness that it goes on.

He can probably, even in those conditions

(of total withdrawal), conclude the hidden war with a disguised defeat, getting credit for doing now what he could have done earlier, under better terms, without the intervening loss of life. The Vice President, with his customary candor, has stated the real goal: "It will be Nixon's peace, and his alone." Well, all right—let it be his. But let it be.

CAMBODIA FINDS ITS PLACE IN THE ASIAN DILEMMA (By Flora Lewis)

SVAYRIENG, CAMBODIA.—This key junction on the major road between Phnom Penh and Saigon is now firmly in Cambodian hands, and the road is—usually—open. But some 15 miles back toward Phnom Penh, at Neak Leung, whole blocks lie in ruins. A devastating Communist raid took Neak Leung by surprise not long ago, and most of the people fled.

North and northwest of here, vast areas of Cambodia are denied to government control, about half of the national territory, although it would be too much to say that the region is all under Communist control.

Every bridge along the canal-laced road from Phnom Penh has been blown at least once. Almost every bridge in Cambodia has been blown, many replaced by Bailey bridges donated by Britain. Here, unlike in Laos and even much of Vietnam, it is a war of destruction and disruption rather than selective combat.

It has led Cambodian nationalists to believe that the North Vietnamese don't just want to impose a sympathetic government in this country, but want to subjugate it. Now whole platoons of soldiers, living with their wives and babies in tiny pup tents made of grass and thatch, guard the vital bridges.

In the circumstances, it may be surprising to hear that Cambodian and American officials alike are pleased with the military situation. It is, as they point out, much better than might have been expected. A year and a half after the fighting started, they no longer veil the dire realities of Cambodia's wildly risky plunge into Vietnam's war.

Now it is conceded that the Vietnamese could probably have taken Phnom Penh at any time they wished in the summer of 1970, but didn't wish to pay the price because they couldn't have mustered enough Cambodian supporters for a victory parade. They were modest, or shrewd, enough to choose against a show of purely Vietnamese Communist strength in the Khmer capital.

The intervening months have been used to multiply the Cambodian army almost 10-fold, provide some equipment and training and establish a defense organization for the first time. The Communists have also used the time, however, to recruit supporters.

Official figures, which must be considered decidedly conservative, show the difference. In the first months of the war, Cambodian officials spoke of the local pro-Communist force, the Khmer Rouge, as negligible. No more than 2,000, they said. They still call the Khmer Rouge negligible. Only 15,000, they say, though that is a 750 per cent growth in something over a year.

But there is a certain stabilization of the front. Neither side has made, nor apparently expects to make, much change in the areas of control for the visible future.

This is really a Nixon doctrine war. The Cambodians and the Vietnamese are fighting. The United States and, on the other side, Russia and China, are providing the wherewithal. Since the Nixon doctrine remains imprecise, however, there are naturally arguments among both Americans and Cambodians about how it should be applied.

Cambodian officials, with support from American military officers, think the United States should Americanize the war at least in the technical sense, with helicopters and

tanks and heavy artillery, if not with manpower. The Cambodian plea, which I heard repeatedly from Premier Lon Nol, his partner Deputy Premier Sirik Matak, Lon Nol's ram-bunctious and lively younger brother Lt. Col. Lon Non, down through the chain of command to the young captain who reported on the tactical situation at Svayrieng, was this: If you won't give us as much as South Vietnam, a more populous country, at least you should give us half as much.

Brig. Gen. Theodore Maxis, who heads the U.S. "military equipment delivery team" here, thinks Cambodia should have more of a chance to fight the American way, with more American support. His Phnom Penh staff, after much argument, was recently limited to an expanded complement of 150 Americans, but he has another 75 working on military help to Cambodia under him in Saigon.

A U.S. mission from Pacific command headquarters recently recommended another 50 people to handle the flow of supplies. U.S. Ambassador Emory Swank, slipping but still trying to cling to the "low-profit" policy in this war, has proposed that the United States hire under contract other nationals—South Koreans, Filipinos, Thais—to do the job more discreetly.

Essentially, Swank and his advisers rely on Congress to limit the funds that would be needed for a bigger American role with men or major weapons. They don't admit it, but congressional truculence is their main defense in resisting the insistent pressures to "really support Cambodia."

Meanwhile, refugees at a camp near here, whose homes were destroyed by U.S. bombing and allied artillery fire, exist with a pitiful shortage of food, shelter, clothing. American funds must be reserved, officials explain, for the military and essential economic programs which other countries won't provide. Humanitarian needs are left to those countries, but they have too many other requests to notice.

Thus Cambodia has found its place in the Southeast Asian dilemma. It looks to the United States to be able to survive, and about all the United States knows how to do is to help speed destruction. Having become involved this far, America can't decently tell the Cambodians to forget it and lose. But neither can either country gain from a bloodier war.

There are no clean answers, now that war unhappily exists here too. For the United States, however, the only helpful answer is to sustain economic aid and refute the Cambodians' belief that what we want most from them is to fight, or that the American way of fighting is the way for Indochina.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire has 2 minutes remaining.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. MCINTYRE. In conclusion, Mr. President, I wish to say that the original request by the Department of Defense for research and development was almost \$8 billion. In effect, the result of the Appropriations Committee utilizing unobligated funds brings that, for all practical purposes, down \$600 million. The effect of the amendment offered by the Senator from New Hampshire would be to restore that \$100 million. The net addition is \$93 million for the research and development which is badly needed and should be restored.

Mr. ELLENDER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MCINTYRE. I yield the remainder

of my time to the Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. ELLENDER. The amount of money was not \$8 billion. It is \$7.9 billion.

Mr. MCINTYRE. \$7,950,000,000.

Mr. ELLENDER. \$7.95 billion. So that it is not \$600 million that we cut it. The total amount is \$539.3 million.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has expired.

The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from New Hampshire. On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk called the roll.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia. I announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. HARTKE), the Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MCGOVERN), the Senator from Maine (Mr. MUSKIE), the Senator from Louisiana (Mr. LONG), and the Senator from Utah (Mr. MOSS) are necessarily absent.

I further announce that the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH) is absent on official business.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Maryland (Mr. BEALL), the Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. COTTON), and the Senator from Maine (Mrs. SMITH) are necessarily absent.

The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. MUNDT) is absent because of illness.

The Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY) is detained on official business, and if present and voting, would vote "nay."

The Senator from Ohio (Mr. SAXBE) is absent on official business.

If present and voting, the Senator from Maine (Mrs. SMITH) would vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 53, nays 33, as follows:

[No. 395 Leg.]

YEAS—53

Allen	Ervin	McIntyre
Baker	Fannin	Miller
Bellmon	Fong	Packwood
Bennett	Gambrell	Pastore
Bentsen	Griffin	Pearson
Bible	Gurney	Schweiker
Boggs	Hansen	Scott
Brock	Hollings	Sparkman
Brooke	Hruska	Stennis
Buckley	Humphrey	Stevens
Byrd, W. Va.	Inouye	Taft
Cannon	Jackson	Talmadge
Chiles	Jordan, N.C.	Thurmond
Cook	Jordan, Idaho	Tower
Cranston	Kennedy	Tunney
Curtis	Magnuson	Weicker
Dominick	Mathias	Williams
Eastland	McGee	

NAYS—33

Aiken	Fulbright	Nelson
Allott	Gravel	Pell
Anderson	Harris	Proxmire
Bayh	Hart	Randolph
Burdick	Hatfield	Ribicoff
Byrd, Va.	Hughes	Roth
Case	Mansfield	Spong
Cooper	McClellan	Stafford
Dole	Metcalf	Stevenson
Eagleton	Mondale	Symington
Ellender	Montoya	Young

NOT VOTING—14

Beall	Javits	Muskie
Church	Long	Percy
Cotton	McGovern	Saxbe
Goldwater	Moss	Smith
Hartke	Mundt	

So Mr. MCINTYRE's amendment was agreed to.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Mr. President, I move that the vote by which the amendment was agreed to be reconsidered.

Mr. BYRD of West Virginia and Mr. CANNON moved to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. CANNON obtained the floor.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Montana.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that amendment No. 747 which was to have been offered be vacated.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CHILES). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I had intended to raise a point of order against a provision contained in H.R. 11731, providing appropriations for the Department of Defense.

Mr. President, on page 43, line 11 of section 731 the Committee on Appropriations, in violation of the Rules of the Senate—rule XVI—has proposed new legislation in an appropriations bill. The legislation is contained in the following language:

Provided further, That funds in this Act shall be available for the procurement of commercial and cargo services only to the extent that the Secretary of Defense determines that such services are required to supplement the cargo airlift capabilities of the Military Airlift Command.

Mr. President, in seeking to explain its action, the Committee on Appropriations, on page 6 of its report, contends that such legislation does not violate rule XVI because it is germane to section 731 of the House bill and is therefore in order.

While I dispute that interpretation and while the Senate may have an opportunity to make a finding whether it is germane, I rise to point out that the amendment completely contradicts and nullifies what has been the policy of Congress and the executive branch of the U.S. Government for more than 15 years.

In light of the violence done by this amendment to longstanding Government policy I am incredulous, Mr. President, that the Appropriations Committee would even consider making such a far-reaching and profound change in policy knowing that this matter has been under review by the Commerce Committee for the last 9 months. Furthermore, I am advised that this subject was never before the committee during hearings on the appropriations bill, nor was the matter discussed, even in passing, by members of the committee during its markup session on the Defense appropriations bill.

Mr. President, it appears to me as though this amendment was inserted in the appropriations bill following a written recommendation by the chairman and the ranking minority member of the committee. That recommendation was made at the direct request of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Secretary Packard was apparently motivated by the fact that the Committee on Commerce had recently ordered reported legislation reaffirming longstanding policy regarding

the role of the Nation's civil air carriers in augmenting the Nation's airlift capability in time of peace as well as in time of national emergency or war.

The Secretary of Defense, the chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee and the Appropriations Committee staff know that this has been a matter of vital concern to the Senate Commerce Committee since February of this year. To date, the Aviation Subcommittee which I chair, has held at least 5 days of hearings on the subject—has exchanged voluminous correspondence on it and finally, in total exasperation, has reported a bill S. 1821—Senate Report 92-503—introduced by my distinguished colleague from Washington, Senator MAGNUSON, forcing the Department of Defense to adhere to the policies established by the Congress and the President.

Apparently believing that it could circumvent the committees possessing jurisdiction in this manner, and thinking that Senator MAGNUSON's legislation could be effectively thwarted through the appropriations process, the Department of Defense surreptitiously and without consulting either Senator MAGNUSON or myself offered an amendment to this bill which does have the effect of killing the provisions of S. 1821. Mr. President this is an unwarranted and devious attempt, by the Department of Defense, to subvert the rules and practices of the Senate to effect a change in policy which has not been authorized by the President or the Congress.

As far back as 1957, the Senate Committee on Appropriations, recognizing the distinction between the role of the Military Air Transportation Service, MATS—now known as MAC—and the civil air carriers in meeting the Nation's airlift needs said:

Last year in the conference committee on the Defense appropriations bill the Senate joined with the House in stating in a letter to the Secretary of Defense that the Government should, to the greatest extent practicable, adjust its use of air transportation so as to use existing unutilized capacity of United States air carriers. This statement was based upon our position that maximum utilization by the Department of Defense of United States civil air carriers is essential both in the promotion of our free enterprise economy and in the provision of the necessary ready reserve civil airlift for national defense; and that Government operations of its own air transport facilities should be limited to that essential to military security. (Senate Report 543, 85th Congress, First session, page 13)

Since that time, several committees of Congress including the Appropriations Committees of both Houses and the Armed Services Committees of both Houses have, time and again, concurred in that view. I will have more to say about that later.

Mr. President for the last several years the Department of Defense and the U.S. Air Force have been slowly undermining this long acknowledged policy. Since acquiring its new fleet of more than 250 C-141 Starlifters, and more than 40 C-5A Galaxies, the Air Force has sought to utilize these aircraft to completely reverse the roles of the Military Airlift Command and the U.S. civil carriers in meeting the international airlift requirements of the Department of Defense.

In fiscal year 1960, the total volume of military cargo which was moved by air was approximately 170,000 tons, of which only 17,500 tons or 10.5 percent was handled by the civil carriers. In the years which followed, the total volume of military cargo increased dramatically, largely as a result of the expanding war in Vietnam. The civil carriers, responding to the need, greatly expanded their cargo capacity, and the Department of Defense, in accordance with its announced policies, allocated to them an ever-increasing amount of military cargo. In percentage terms, the civil carriers' share of military cargo reached its peak in fiscal year 1962, when they carried 40.5 percent of all cargo moved by air. In terms of tonnage, the peak was reached in fiscal year 1967, when the civil carriers handled a total of 202,000 tons, which represented 33.6 percent of the total military cargo shipped that year.

Then, very suddenly, the trend was reversed. Although total military cargo shipments continued to grow in fiscal years 1968 and 1969, the amounts allocated to the civil carriers fell to 163,000 tons or 24 percent in 1968, and 148,000 tons or 20.3 percent in 1969.

In fiscal years 1970 and 1971 the total military cargo shipped began to decline, due to the reduction in the level of warfare in Vietnam. The amount carried by the civil carriers, however, fell off much more dramatically. In 1970, the airlines carried only 15.7 percent or 104,000 tons.

What has happened is obvious. There has been a complete reversal of policy. After inducing the civil carriers to acquire substantial cargo capacity by offering them a fair share of military cargo business, the Department of Defense has simply pulled the rug out.

In a memorandum submitted by the Air Force to me on April 7, this reversal of policy is quite clearly revealed. That memorandum states that—

Efficiency and economy dictate the use of this (MAC) capability to satisfy logistic support requirements. (p. 1.)

It further states that—

The primary role now developing for the civil air carriers is to replace the MAC aircraft on their worldwide DOD logistics support route when they are diverted to carry out a wartime deployment. (p. 2.)

Otherwise, the only role contemplated for the civil carriers, so far as international cargo is concerned, is—

To satisfy peak international cargo demands. (p. 3.)

In "The Role of MATS in Peace and War," the definitive document on U.S. policy, the very first item listed under the heading "Presidentially Approved Courses of Action" reads as follows:

1. That MATS be equipped and operated in peacetime to meet approved military hard-core requirements in a general war and in situations short of general war, and such other military requirements as cannot be met adequately by commercial carriers on an effective and timely basis. (p. 5)

The Air Force has now turned this policy on its head. It proposed to use the civil carriers only for "such other military requirements as cannot be met adequately" by the military. The amendment

in section 731 of this Appropriations bill seeks to ratify this change in policy.

Aside from being militarily short-sighted, the new Air Force policy is contrary to the whole philosophy of our free enterprise system. In effect, MAC is now running a cargo airline, at the taxpayers' expense, in direct competition with the commercial carriers. In the 1950's, the Congress repeatedly criticized MATS, MAC's predecessor for engaging in precisely this kind of competition with private enterprise. The Department of Defense ultimately recognized the validity of this criticism, and specifically altered its policies in response to it. This, indeed, is what "The Role of MATS in Peace and War" was all about.

Contrary to what the Air Force would have the Senate believe, MAC's cargo operations today go far beyond the requirements of minimum training of flight crews. Until recently, MAC's cargo fleet was operating as much as 8 hours per day, and it is only because the volume of cargo has diminished that it is now proposing to reduce its operations to 4 to 4½ hours per day. The Air Force memorandum submitted to me on April 7 makes it crystal clear that its utilization of military cargo aircraft is now being pegged to military cargo requirements, rather than training and hard-core requirements. This is squarely contrary to established policy, and constitutes direct competition with the commercial carriers.

The current Air Force policy flouts not only the longstanding policy of the President, but also the recommendations made just last year by the House Airlift Subcommittee. In its report, that committee specifically disapproved the reduction in the civil carriers' share of military cargo traffic:

This reduction in cargo airlift allocated to the CRAF participants is no incentive for the commercial carriers to order new cargo aircraft to offset the existing deficit.

The C-5A was designed to airlift vehicles and cargo outside to the C-141, not troops or general cargo. Yet the Air Force and MAC now propose to use the C-5 in peacetime for movement of general cargo—both bulk and palletized—under the guise of maintaining flight crew proficiency.

The effect of such a policy will be the elimination of a substantial commercial cargo airlift capability now available from the civil carriers, in particular the supplementals. . . (H.A.S.C. No. 91-59, pp. 9236-37.)

The Air Force seems to think it can use its own aircraft for routine cargo carriage in times of peace, and still expect the civil carriers to take over that function in times of emergency or of "peak" demand. Clearly, this makes no economic sense. The commercial carriers cannot afford idle capacity—their present financial posture makes that clear enough. If the Department of Defense does not use their cargo capability, then they will be forced to put it to work elsewhere or dispose of it. Either way, it will not be available to provide immediate airlift service for the military in times of national crisis. And certainly the civil carriers will not be willing or able to expand their cargo capacity unless there is an immediate and continuing market for it.

The basic concept of the policies which