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Domestic Policy:
Military Spending
July 31, 1970
Congressional Record - Senate: Pages 2667 - 26790
Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, first, I should like to commend the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) for an outstanding piece of research, and for his contribution toward a better understanding of the military weapons systems we are being asked to support through the budget operations of the Government.
I should also like to commend the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, for the fine cooperation he has extended to those of us involved in making research and other evaluations on weapons systems.
I can assure him that, as one who has associated himself with a number of amendments that will be appearing on the floor during the next few weeks, I am certain we can work out time agreements, and such other things, in order to expedite the discussions as quickly as possible, yet cover the subject thoroughly.
Mr. President, there are basic underlying questions which are presented to us by this defense bill: yet these are rarely considered when the Congress authorizes the expenditure of billions of dollars in the name of security. Our debate has usually focused upon whether a particular tank or plane or missile is the cheapest one that could be built or perhaps whether it is actually required for the mission it is to fulfill. We have been greatly concerned–and rightfully so–about the enormous cost overruns that have afflicted various weapons systems. I know that the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee shares this particular concern as well, and has advocated steps to prevent such overruns in the future acquisition of major weapons systems.
Excessive costs and inefficient management should rightfully disturb the Congress. Yet I do not believe this to be the most urgent and troubling factor in our rate of defense spending.
We must begin consideration of defense expenditures by asking what the meaning of national security is in today’s world. Since our ultimate aim is international peace and security, we must determine exactly what forces tend to undermine that peace, and how they best can be met.
There is no doubt that our world is afflicted with tension and turbulence. In the last 10 years, 82 governments have been overthrown by some type of coup d’etats, rebellions, or revolts. And there are about 22 active insurrections in various countries today, such as Angola, Burma, Columbia, and several other countries. But what are the roots of these conflicts, how do they affect our own security, and how might they be resolved?
Revolutions are born, in my judgment, out of impatience with suffering rather than from a passion for bloodletting. When two-thirds of the world is hungry and impoverished, and when they are often the victims of political systems which serve exclusive interests and do little to meet the overall needs of their population, it should come as no surprise that international stability remains elusive. But the sources of the instability must be clearly understood: economic deprivation, human suffering, and political oppression.
Now we all know that the Communist powers in our world have an ideology that is hostile to our own–as well as to each other, however—and that these countries possess significant military might. We must be prepared to defend ourselves if they ever intend to use their power against us aggressively. Yet, we should examine the probability of such an action, and recognize that the greatest actual sources of conflict today are rooted in economic, social, and political grievances rather than the result of aggressive, hostile military actions by the Communist superpowers.
One of the characteristics of the nuclear age is the increasing inability to effectively achieve political aims through the use of military force. We once lived in a world where military supremacy insured political supremacy. But today, with the capacity for destruction several times over resting in the hands of major powers, military supremacy has far less of a political advantage. What advantage is it if we kill the Russian population 10 times over, but they can only kill us six times over?
Furthermore, the use of even conventional military might by a major power is no certain means of achieving political objectives. If anything, it seems that the use of conventional military power in an interventionist manner is often counter-productive. Our own experience in Vietnam perhaps best demonstrates the inability of conventional military power to achieve a political objective—or to impose a particular type of political stability. The doctrine of “flexible response” designed to give our conventional military power the capability of responding to situations with a measured amount of military force, led us into the enduring Vietnam conflict rather than maintaining international stability. Furthermore, the presence of our troops in other lands at times can contribute to the internal instability of these governments than to the overall stability of a particular region.
The truth we are discovering is that political stability and international security are the function of political and economic rather than military factors. Political stability—or peace—can seldom be imposed for long by one country over another through the mere use of threat of its military power.
Now I realize that these might appear to be highly speculative considerations. But they are not irrelevant.
Each year we are asked to appropriate billions of dollars to buy new weapons and sustain the world’s largest number of men in an active army. But no one seems to seriously ever ask the question—“Just what is this all going to be good for? What is the role of conventional military power in today’s world? What is the relation between the military might we possess and our political and strategic aims? What is the basis for building international security?”
The answers to such issues may be uncertain; yet we must address ourselves to these concerns before we blindly proceed with the unquestioned approval of billions for our military capability.
We all tend to assume that the military forces we support are determined by our foreign goals and the logical result of our desire to achieve certain international objectives. We know, for instance, that the Soviets have a strategic nuclear force which must be deterred through our own strategic nuclear force.
And we know that if countries hostile to us choose for some reason to aggressively invade neighbors who were our allies, then we should be prepared to insure some kind of an effective defense. The Armed Forces we possess, then, should be what is required to accomplish these ends.
The disturbing fact, however, is that as one studies our defense posture, he discovers that it has little relation to our foreign policy goals. The forces that comprise our defense are more the result of the momentum of the military bureaucracy than of any other factor. Our defense posture simply does not reflect an analysis of what is necessary to accomplish the ends of our foreign policy. Rather, it is the product of what competing services have successfully justified as being useful and have been approved by an unquestioning Congress under the rubric of national security.
The forces we presently possess and sustain enable us to act as a world policeman anywhere in the world, whenever we please. The wisdom of such unilateral intervention has been thoroughly discussed and has been frequently doubted, both within Congress and the executive branch. Yet, we have not seriously questioned whether we should maintain the capability to unilaterally intervene militarily any place we choose to in the world. Even though we know that in any situation of internal political instability, outside intervention by a great power is likely to be counterproductive; we still prepare ourselves for this capability. The mere possession of this capability, with all the preplanned strategies and contingency plans, increases the likelihood that we might take such action. I am not suggesting that our defense somehow be totally devoid of anything that might be used for some kind of foreign intervention. But I am suggesting that if we believe that unilateral intervention in the internal political conflicts is generally not a wise or necessary step, then we should examine carefully the priority we are giving to such a capability in the development of our military forces.
Our defense posture is also designed to fight a conventional war at sea—presumably—with the Soviet Navy. I do not believe I have ever heard any discussion about just how likely it would be for us to get involved in a conventional conflict of this type with the Soviet Union that would also stop short of nuclear war. Moreover, even if we do accept the need to prepare for such a conflict, we should ask whether our surface Navy—or any country’s surface ships—can be adequately defended against the modern armaments that military technology has created. Yet, billions of dollars are invested each year in the proposition that we should be prepared to fight a conventional war at sea against our potential enemies.
The Department of Defense has also claimed, in the past, that our forces have the capability to fight, all at once, in a major war in Europe, a major land war in Asia, and a minor intervention elsewhere in the world. This of course is the so-called 2 ½-war contingency. I have actually never heard a rationale as to why it was felt we should have to prepare for such an eventuality. I myself find it incredible to picture a situation where we are fighting in a conventional war against the Soviet Union on the continent of Europe, fighting against the Chinese or their allies with our ground troops somewhere on the mainland of Asia in another conventional war at the same time, and finally also carrying out some military intervention in South America. Yet, we assume all of this would go on, but that it would not result in any nuclear conflict. Our defense posture has been justified by its ability to accomplish all this.
So it appears to me that our defense posture has not been related in any realistic way to an assessment of what we really want to do in the world to achieve our foreign policy objective. Rather, it has been an amalgamation of everything that the military can do in the world.
Now I want to point out that this administration, according to its own statements and reports, has begun the process of trying to relate our military capabilities to our strategic goals. They are sensitive to this need and trying to set new policies. Yet, the results and implications of what they are doing for the defense budget remains to be seen. In the meantime, it is Congress which has the constitutional responsibility for trying to define what kind of military force we should have, and for what purposes it should be prepared and utilized.
In past years, Congress has refused to question seriously what has been presented to them as essential to the security of the country. Despite the fact that forces and pressures which result in the eventual requests for defense expenditures are largely the result of bureaucratic momentum, these programs are presented as the logical result of what has been determined to be absolutely necessary for national security. With thousands of dedicated public servants working for the Department of Defense, Congress has naturally assumed that they and only they can propose what we need for the defense of our Nation. The requests that come from the Defense Department are seen as a carefully thought-out approach to what is required to preserve national security. To spend a penny less than what is requested, it is suggested, will put that security in jeopardy.
I think we should realize that the posture and weapons system requested by the Defense Department as essential to security do not carry with them any mandate from heaven. It is the approximated guess of dedicated people working in an enormously complex bureaucracy and influenced heavily by the interests and biases of that bureaucracy. Their presentation of what is generally required for overall national security is no better or no worse than what the Congress may decide is necessary, on a completely independent basis.
Further, it must be remembered that the Defense Department defines and regards “national security in the narrowest vein. Only the military factor is considered.
But when Congress evaluates the requirements of “national security,” it must recognize that our true security is a combination of economic health, political stability, domestic tranquility, national unity and dedication, as well as our military resources.
Congress has the unique task of judging the relationship between all these factors as it attempts to insure our Nation’s security.
The events of this week should bring these issues into a sharp focus. New York City has barely been able to function and its citizens’ safety has been jeopardized by a pollution and power-shortage crisis. There is no doubt that this poses a direct danger to the security of that city.
During the same week a Presidential panel appointed to study the Defense Department concluded:
We are all amazed that it (the Defense Department) works at all.
Why should any Member of Congress honestly believe that our security is best protected by spending every dollar that is proposed by the Pentagon, and thus depriving resources for solving the crisis being felt this week by New York and threatening every major urban area in our land?
The task for Congress, in my judgment, is to relate the foreign policy objectives and strategic aims we wish to pursue as a nation—to the defense posture that we authorize. This must be done with attention given to our available resources and the necessity of meeting a variety of needs in order to truly provide for our Nation’s security.
Previous defense expenditures have resulted from almost automatic approval of the Pentagon’s wishes and proposals because of the vacuum created by the Congress lack of responsibility in examining defense requests. Thus, it is Congress which must redress this imbalance—and Congress which must assume any responsibility for inordinate defense expenditures.
We can—and, in fact, should—speculate about what our broad-range goals in the world should be, what our commitments and treaties should ideally be, and what methods we should rely on in the future for building international order. It is important that this kind of reflection go on in a serious manner within Congress.
Yet, we know that our present situation in the world presents us with immediate realities which cannot be ignored. In considering what our defense posture should be this year, and what resources we should allocate for the defense budget, we must realize that we have assumed a particular role in the world and do have various involvements which cannot be ignored.
So I want to make this proposal. Let us look at our present responsibilities in this world. We know that we have commitments, both in formal treaties and secret agreements. Conceivably, these might require us to have mobile forces which could be moved quickly to various parts of the globe. We know that we have a commitment to NATO and that at least for now we must maintain a capability to meet an aggressive action in that part of the world. Further, the Nixon administration has outlined its own new doctrine with respect to Asia. They have stated that we would not use our ground troops for a land war in the Asian mainland, and that the defense of Asian countries should be their own responsibility, with our supporting assistance. The Guam doctrine, as it is called, has been set forth on several occasions as the official polity to be guiding our future actions in Asia. The implementation of this doctrine, then, must also be considered in determining our defense posture.
Finally, we know that the Soviets have an arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons, and that our present policy rests upon our ability to deter any possible Soviet attack by possessing the certain capabilities of destroying the enemy, should they initiate an attack upon us. Thus, we must provide for a continued credible deterrent force.
Now let me emphasize that I may have serious reservations about some of these working assumptions. I certainly do not agree with all our foreign commitments, and worry about how they can lead us into dangerous military involvements. The senior Senator from Missouri (Mr. SYMINGTON) has spoken eloquently and worked hard at this very point, and I respect greatly his efforts to actually discover the commitments our Nation has, and what implications they have. Furthermore, I may not agree with particular assessments of where our interests in the world actually lie. The President has said, and rightfully so, that our interests must shape our commitments. It could well be that the administration’s notion of our interests in the world—in Europe and Asia—could differ from my own assessment. Likewise, there might be legitimate questions which could be raised about the whole concept of deterrence.
Finally, many of these matters, such as foreign commitments as well as our strategic posture, might be changed through various negotiations. Taking all these factors into account, let us grant the foreign and strategic objectives that are presently operative—regardless of whether we agree with them all or not—and then let us see what kind of defense posture is required to fulfill them.
Taking this framework, several Members of Congress came together again this year to analyze our military budget. We did so recognize that there were commitments and policies which had to be followed. Yet, we sought to analyze whether our expenditures for defense were adequate or excessive for those purposes. The military spending report, which I was privileged to chair, with the cooperation of colleagues in the House and the Senate, was prepared in order to provide further knowledge and examination of defense requests. It has been made available to all Members of Congress in order to enhance our ability to make these difficult judgments.
Let me briefly summarize the main findings of this report: First, we discussed various general topics, such as the relationship between defense spending and the economy. We noted how excessive defense spending has a larger inflationary effect on the economy than any other kind of Government spending. Further, we found that it is difficult to discover any substantial reductions in the defense budget that have not been the result of a lower level of spending in Vietnam. Reductions in the budget, as best as can be determined, have come primarily from that source, though some other savings might have been realized. This is hard to determine with complete precision, however, because the administration has not provided us with concrete estimates of the war’s costs for this year.
The report then examined various components in the Defense budget, looking first to our expenditures for strategic arms. Our conclusion was that a completely credible deterrent force, fully capable of providing an assured destruction capability, could be maintained for considerably less expenditure and without the deployment of various components presently planned for our future strategic arsenal. In general, we recommended maintaining our triple deterrent of bombers, land-based missiles, and the Polaris fleet, but not continually upgrading each of these at costs which are excessive. For instance, we believe that the life of the B-52 bomber force should be preserved, but that we should not move forward with the procurement of the AMSA—advanced manned strategic bomber—which could entail an eventual expenditure of $10 billion. In a similar fashion, we recommend against major increased costs for our land-based missiles, such as the MIRV program. It is our general contention that the efforts to improve and upgrade our deterrent force should be placed with the most reliable and invulnerable component part—our Polaris system.
For this reason also, we approved of the continued research and development request for the under seas long-range missile system which could conceivably serve as a further enhancement to our deterrent force, if needed in future years and in the absence of successful SALT negotiations.
Let me add a few other comments about our strategic forces. Our projections about what is necessary to preserve an assured destruction capability are based on a number of assumptions that need careful examination. For instance, in such projections, we always assume that all of the Soviets’ systems will work perfectly, and our systems will function poorly. We make this assumption in order to be safe; but of course, if the Soviets were actually planning an attack, they would never make such an assumption.
Further, we always protect against what is called the greater than expected threat. This means that we listen to all that the intelligence agencies say is the Soviet threat, and then try to imagine an even greater threat—which often requires a good deal of creative thinking—and then design our forces to protect against even this greater than expected threat.
“Assured destruction” is defined as destroying 25 percent of the Soviet population and 50 percent of its industry. By conservative estimates, 400 warheads can do far better than that. At present, we can deliver 4,200 nuclear warheads to the Soviet Union. Part of the reason for this enormous overkill is that we require each component part of the strategic arsenal—our missiles, bombers, and submarines—to be able to inflict, completely on its own, such a destructive force.
Finally, in making our projections, we do not include any damage which can be inflicted on the Soviets through our conventional forces—such as our tactical nuclear weapons placed in Europe and elsewhere, our tactical airpower, and the rest of our conventional military forces deployed at points close to the Soviet Union.
It seems obvious, then, that a reasonable readjustment in these assumptions alone would result in a more realistic strategic posture.
The report also considers various parts of the Defense budget that are devoted to our general purposes forces.
Mr. President, I do not wish to take the extensive time required to go into each one of the report’s findings and recommendations in the area of general purpose forces—including our tactical airpower, our naval forces, and our manpower levels. But I do know that these will be of vital interest to the Members of the Congress. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that the summaries and recommendations of each section of the report be inserted in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks. Since the entire report is nearly 150 pages long, I will not ask that it appear in the RECORD in its entirety-but that 25 pages giving these summaries and recommendations are printed in the RECORD.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. HATFIELD. In summary, the “Military Spending Report of Members of Congress for Peace Through Law,” prepared by over 25 Senators and Congressmen, concludes that reductions of as much as $4 to $5 billion in requests for weapons systems, with another $4 to $8 billion in potential savings from manpower reductions, all during this fiscal year.
The long effect of those savings, in other words, the potential full costs of these various weapons systems we question, combined with manpower savings over this same period, could be close to $100 billion.
It is staggering that this amount of resources will ultimately be affected by our decisions on the defense bill this year. I want to emphasize that the findings of the Military Spending Committee report represent savings that are possible in this year’s budget without any change in our international commitments, without any reassessment of our interests, or any change in our basic strategic policies and objectives.
I know that Members of the Congress will want to study this report in greater detail, and trust that it will be a useful contribution to our dialog and our judgments on these issues.
Mr. President, I have been greatly encouraged by the reports that the Nixon administration is attempting to clarify the relation between our strategic objectives in the world and our defense posture. It is well known that the National Security Council and the Department of Defense have been engaged in the massive task of reviewing our commitments and interests, and then attempting to relate them to our force levels. Furthermore, I was most encouraged when the Guam doctrine or the Nixon doctrine was set forth by the administration. It was with wisdom and courage that we declared it would not be our future policy to fight with our own ground troops in a land war in Asia.
Now it is natural to ask what effect this new doctrine should have on our defense posture and the composition of our general purpose forces.
Few realize that the largest bulk of expenditures for defense comes from the support of our conventional military forces—roughly two-thirds of the Defense budget, with less than one-third necessary for preserving our strategic nuclear deterrent force. The size of these conventional general purpose forces has been determined in the past by the 2 ½-war contingency. We have had the forces required to fight simultaneously a land war in Asia, to defend against an attack on NATO, and a minor conflict somewhere else.
The posture necessary to perform this mission consisted of 2.7 million men in the Armed Forces. This included 19 2/3 active divisions, seven priority reserve divisions, 23 tactical air wings, 15 naval attack carrier task forces, and additional forces for antisubmarine warfare, amphibious warfare, and airlift and sealift. Different portions of these forces are allocated to meet these various possible contingencies.
When our involvement in Vietnam began and escalated, we added on the troops and forces necessary for that conflict all in addition to our basic general purpose forces. Thus, the expenditures and manpower in Vietnam are all in addition to the basic posture of the general purposes forces determined by the 2 ½-war contingency. As manpower was sent to Vietnam, for instance, the size of our Army increased from the basic 2.7 million-man level to about 3.5 million men.
The cost of maintaining the general purpose forces of the size to fight 2 ½ simultaneous wars—not counting Vietnam—is about $44 billion. Broken down, this includes about $19.1 billion for the NATO contingency, $16.3 billion for an Asian land war, $1.3 billion for a minor intervention somewhere else, and $7.3 billion as a reserve, presumably for forces to be moved wherever they are needed. Specifically, the portion of the forces that are devoted to the Asian contingency are six Active Army divisions, two active Marine divisions, six Navy air wings, seven Air Force air wings, and a sizable portion of our ASW—amphibious, airlift, and sealift forces.
The current defense budget we are considering assumes that we will continue to pay for the 2 ½-war contingency in our expenditures for general purpose forces. The request for about $72 billion can be analyzed as follows: About $43 to $44 billion for general-purpose forces, $17 to $18 billion for our strategic nuclear forces, and $11 to $12 billion for the Vietnam War in the next year. I would point out that is the conservative way of figuring the war, and it is set forth by Charles Schultze, former Director of the Bureau of the Budget. However, the Cambodian invasion will probably cause the costs of the war to rise above that estimate.
The Department of Defense has stated that by the end of fiscal year 1971, or by June 30, 1971, the projected manpower level will be about 2.9 million. If we assume that the Vietnam withdrawal rates proceed as announced and continue at that rate until that time, we will have about 240,000 to 250,000 men in Vietnam at that time. One could add to this about an additional 100,000 to 150,000 men in the Armed Forces as the direct result of the war—men who were in the pipeline somewhere, for instance. But that leaves between 2.5 to 2.6 million men comprising our basic general purpose force posture. Perhaps this represents a small reduction of our basic manpower requirements during the coming fiscal year below the previous 2.7 million baseline manpower force. If so, such reductions would be the result of efficiency steps announced or taken to reduce excess manpower. However, it would not be reflective of any basic change in the composition of our general purpose forces.
But since the administration has announced that we are now to be guided by the Guam doctrine, then I would propose its implementation for the current defense budget. Specifically, this would mean that we would remove from our general purpose forces those portions assigned to fight a ground war in Asia—not including, as I have stated, our forces in Vietnam. This would result in the elimination of six Army divisions, three wings of tactical aircraft, a good portion of our antisubmarine and amphibious force in the Pacific, and six carrier task forces. However, this would still leave significant portions of general purpose forces for use in Asia in a supporting capacity to carry out the Nixon doctrine. Specifically, this would include two Marine divisions, six tactical air wings, and three potential carrier task forces, plus, of course, our program of military assistance to various Asian nations.
The budgetary result of these steps would be a savings of about $10 billion in this year’s defense budget.
Thus, if we but implement the Nixon doctrine in our defense posture, creating a rational relationship between our foreign policy objectives and the composition of military forces, the budget which has been requested can be reduced by up to $10 billion.
Let me point out that Charles Schultze, former Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and William W. Kaufman, former assistant to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, have both testified to this point before various committees of the Senate this year. I ask unanimous consent that their testimony be introduced into the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibits 2 and 3.)
Mr. HATFIELD. There is one other important factor to point out in this regard. The Nixon administration has made a pledge to institute an all-volunteer military, and a Presidential Commission has further endorsed the merits and feasibility of this proposal. The chief concern expressed by the administration to date has been that the possible cost of an all-volunteer force may not make it possible to end the draft by mid-1971. Now I believe strongly that the true costs of a volunteer army would make this utterly feasible not only in a year’s time, but even today. But let me point out the implications of putting the Nixon doctrine into effect in our defense posture for the prospects of an all-volunteer army. Removing the Asian contingency from our general purpose force planning, as I have described, would reduce our manpower by at least 400,000 men, and probably by more. That would create a manpower level by the end of fiscal year 1971 of no more than 2.5 million, and easily 2.3 or 2.4 million—assuming the announced rate of withdrawals from Vietnam. The budgetary cost of creating volunteer military at level, using the very conservative estimates given by the Gates Commission, would be $2 billion or less for this fiscal year. That would be offset by the savings of $10 billion.
The budgetary crisis in our Government is well known. During these very days the President is trying to make decisions about the fiscal year 1972 budget. And the largest compelling factor in all this is defense expenditures. It is our level of defense spending, more than anything else, which will decide whether or not we will have a deficit or a surplus budget, whether or not we will have a fiscal dividend in coming years; whether or not inflation will be halted; whether or not our housing goals will be met; whether or not the pollution crisis will be solved; whether or not our major urban centers will be livable; and whether or not we will build our Nation’s resources and preserve our political system.
Seventy-two billion dollars is too much to spend for defense. It will create an insecure America rather than protecting our security. Without rewriting a single treaty, canceling a single commitment, or reversing a strategic objective, we could actually eliminate as much as $15 billion from this year’s defense budget and enhance our overall national security. Up to $2.5 billion could be reduced from the cost of certain unnecessary new weapons systems, and $10 billion could be reduced by following the Nixon doctrine.
Protecting and enhancing our national security—that is our task. Let us do so. But let us develop a defense posture that is related to what we say we want to do in the world. If we only do that much, then we will also be able to do what we must here at home if we are to survive our domestic threats as well and live in peace.
EXHIBIT 1
MILITARY SPENDING REPORT
INTRODUCTION
As members of the Military Spending Committee of Members of Congress for Peace through Law and other involved offices, we submit this year’s Military Spending Report as a bipartisan review of selected military programs. Obviously, this list is not exhaustive. We feel, however, that these issues demand greater public and Congressional attention.
Our examination of the utility and necessity of requested defense funding is made with particular concern for fiscal responsibility and will have a deep interest in a proper allocation of national resources. We have concluded that significant reductions can be made without in any way weakening our national security. Indeed, the improved management and procurement practices we recommend would undoubtedly strengthen the national military posture. A reordering of national priorities, moreover, would help stabilize the economy on which all our federal programs are based and would release funds for the education and basic research on which our future security will depend. While we may not be in complete agreement on specific recommendations, we are unanimous in our recommendations for adjustments in the FY 1971 DOD budget, including general reductions.
Recommended retrenchments for FY 1971 range from $4.4-5.4 billion, excluding manpower. The FY 1971 recommended cut including manpower considerations would roughly double this figure. But since the projects affected involved long term funding commitments, the immediate cutback figures understate the long term savings. Projecting the full cost implications, our recommendations would produce eventual savings from $95-100 billion (including manpower).
While the 1969 Military Spending Report was concerned almost exclusively with weapon systems, we thought it necessary this year to also address the question of overseas troop deployment, threat projections, and the impact of defense spendinig on the economy. In each case, we offer recommendations pinpointing problem areas.
We emphasize that this is only a small part of what should be a continuing review of military programs by Congress and the public.
We invite the comments and support of other Members of Congress.
Mark O. Hatfield, Chairman, MCPL Military Spending Committees,
Thomas F. Eagleton, Charles E. Goodell, Mike Gravel, Vance Hartke, Harold E. Hughes, Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., George S. McGovern, Walter F. Mondale, Gaylord Nelson, William Proxmire, Senators; Brock Adams, Edward P Boland, George E. Brown, Jr., Jeffery Cohelan, Donald M. Fraser, Gilbert Gude, Lee H. Hamilton, Robert L. Leggett, Abner J. Mikva, William S. Moorhead, Charles A Mosher, F. Bradford Morse, Lucien N Nedzi, Ogden R. Reid, Henry S. Reuss, Morris K. Udall, Congressmen.
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